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An Experimental Investigation of
Alternative Explanations for Hindsight
Effects in Appraisal of Capital Budgeting Decisions
Abstract
Three alternative explanations for hindsight effects in the
context of capital budgeting decision appraisal are described: a
cognitive schema explanation, a "knew-it-all-along" explanation
and an incentives/escalation explanation. Subseguently, the
viability of each explanation is investigated in an experiment in
which subjects evaluated a committee's decisions to invest in one
of two competing projects. The prior commitment of the evaluator
and the valence of the project's outcome were manipulated. Ex-
perimental results fully support the cognitive schema explanation
for effects of hindsight on the decision appraisals, but provide
only limited support for either of the other explanations. The
evidence does indicate, however, that the knew-it-all-along and
the incentive/escalation explanations could have had another,
non-hindsight, effect on the decision appraisals. Theoretical
implications are discussed, as are implications for design of
management control and evaluation systems and attendent informa-
tion subsystems.

An Experimental Investigation of
Alternative Explanations For Hindsight
Effects in Appraisal of Capital Budgeting Decisions
Research investigating performance appraisal within organi-
zations indicates that such evaluations often are affected by
personal, contextual and psychometric factors. One potentially
significant contextual factor is that performance appraisals
generally are made in varying degrees of hindsight (i.e., after
outcomes of performances are at least partially known) . Further,
evaluators often have been involved previously with the evaluatee
and/or with the evaluatee' s performance process.
Judgment and decision making studies, usually involving
tasks other than performance appraisal, generally report that the
probability subjects assess for an event when outcomes are not
known (foresight) is significantly smaller than the "prior" prob-
ability that subjects assess for the same event when it is known
to have occurred (hindsight). 2 Mitchell and Kalb [1981], extend-
ing hindsight research into a performance appraisal context
(nursing supervisors' evaluations of hypothetical nurse perform-
ances)
,
found that reporting an outcome (particularly when nega-
tive) significantly increased its perceived probability. Evalua-
tors also were found to make more causal attributions to evalua-
tees in hindsight performance appraisals than in foresight. The
evaluators, however, did not have prior involvement with, nor
commitment to, either the evaluatee or the evaluatee 's perform-
ance processes.
Studies investigating effects of hindsight on judgment and
decision making have been increasing within the business and
accounting research literatures. In particular, researchers
recently have examined the effects of hindsight on tax profes-
sionals' advice to taxpayers (Helleloid [1988]), on managers'
assessments of strategic decisions (Bukszar and Connolly [1988]),
on managers' evaluations of capital budgeting proposals (Brown
and Solomon [1987]), and on financial statement users' predic-
tions of a company's bankruptcy (Buchman [1985]). With the
exception of Brown and Solomon [1987], evaluators in these
studies had no prior involvement with, or commitment to, either
the evaluatee or the alternative courses of action. Further,
although these studies investigated if hindsight effects were
present, none attempted to explain such effect in terms of its
various potential underlying causes. This paper describes an
experimental investigation of alternative explanations for
hindsight effects (i.e., the effects of outcome knowledge) on
appraisals of capital budgeting decisions when the evaluator is
not independent of the evaluatee and/or the course of action
being evaluated.
In the present experiment (more fully described below) , sub-
jects were both an advisor to the evaluatee while the evaluatee
was making his (her) decision and subsequently , an evaluator of
the evaluatee 's decision. Consider the following possibilities:
1) the evaluator either could agree or not agree with the evalua-
tee • s decision as to the ex ante best course of action, and 2)
5subsequent outcomes could indicate that the action which the
evaluatee decided to take either was or was not the ex post best
action. The evaluator's prior advice concerning courses of ac-
tion, including recommendation of a particular course of action,
should induce his (her) commitment to that course of action. If
the evaluatee were to adopt such advice, the evaluator effective-
ly would become committed to the evaluatee (through agreement on
the ex ante best decision) as well as to the advised course of
action. However, if the evaluatee were not to adopt the evalua-
tor's advice (thus, they disagree on the ex ante best decision),
the evaluator would not become committed to the evaluatee (but
still should be committed to his [her] advised course of action)
.
Within such a context it is possible to distinguish between
alternative explanations for hindsight effects on decision
appraisals: a cognitive schema explanation, a "knew-it-all-along"
explanation and an incentives/escalation explanation. The next
section of this paper develops a theoretical basis for these
alternative hindsight effect explanations, including hypotheses
to be tested within the context of appraisal of capital budgeting
decisions. The third section describes the laboratory experi-
ment, and the experimental results are presented in the subse-
quent section. The final section contains a discussion of this
study's relation to prior research, as well as implications for
the design of management control and evaluation systems and
attendent information subsystems.
Explanations for Hindsight Effects in Decision Appraisals
A Cognitive Schema Explanation
One explanation for hindsight effects is presented by
Fischhoff [1975] and Hogarth [1980] who speculated that memory
may be restructured by outcome information such that past uncer-
tainties are not salient. Einhorn and Hogarth [1981] also sug-
gested that hindsight effects may be due to an individual's
"fluency of diagnostic thinking." That is, outcome information
may facilitate development of a coherent story and, once deve-
loped, forward inference (i.e., prediction of outcomes) appears
less uncertain because the multiplicity of causation has been
reduced (i.e., the number of alternative outcomes are reduced by
diminishing those that do not involve the coherent story) . Simi-
larly, in hindsight, causal schemata for alternative outcomes may
be considerably less available for recall than the schema for the
reported outcome (see Nisbett and Ross [1980]).
Considering evaluator involvement, evaluators who have been
involved with the evaluatee's decision process prior to knowing
the outcome could have causal schemata that are more developed
(i.e., schemata that contain more detail and stronger relations)
than uninvolved evaluators. This, in turn, could increase the
availability of alternative causal schemata and increase the per-
ceived multiplicity of causation. Thus, the propensity for hind-
sight effects would be decreased in decision appraisals made by
an involved evaluator relative to that in decision appraisals of
an uninvolved evaluator.
When the evaluator's prior involvement includes a commitment
to a particular target (a course of action and/or an evaluatee)
,
such commitment requires additional cognition to justify target
choice. In such situations, the evaluator's schema for his (her)
target of commitment would continue to be developed, but further
development of schemata for alternatives that are not targets of
commitment could be diminished. Assuming that the evaluatee'
s
choice of action focuses the evaluator's attention when apprais-
ing the evaluatee 's decisions, a less-developed schema will be
activated by the evaluator when the evaluatee has adopted a
course of action to which the evaluator was not committed. Acti-
vating a less-developed schema should cause hindsight effects to
be increased in decision appraisals made by an evaluator who is
both involved and committed (relative to that in appraisals made
by an involved, but uncommitted evaluator) . Additionally, inter-
ference by the more-developed schema for the committed target and
the propensity for elements of less-developed schemata to be
forgotten could further increase hindsight effects. Thus, in the
present experimental context the cognitive schema explanation
predicts that (also see Figure 2)
:
Hindsight decision appraisals will differ from foresight
appraisals only when the evaluator does not agree with the
evaluatee 's decision. In such situations, decision apprai-
sals will be:
a. More positive in hindsight than in foresight when the
reported outcome indicates that the evaluatee 's deci-
sion is the ex post best decision, and
b. More negative in hindsight than in foresight when the
reported outcome indicates that the evaluatee 's deci-
sion is not the ex post best decision.
8A Knew-It-All-Alonq Explanation
Some researchers have suggested that to maintain their sense
of control and to enhance both their self images and how they are
perceived by others, judges in hindsight are motivated to act as
if they always knew what was going to occur. 3 Thus, when the
evaluator is not committed previously to the evaluatee nor to the
evaluatee's course of action, the evaluator is motivated to act
as if he (she) knew all along whatever outcome is reported. How-
ever, when the evaluator is committed to the evaluatee and/or the
evaluatee's course of action, the prior commitment should inhibit
the evaluator from adopting the knew-it-all-along position when
the reported outcome is less than desirable, but not when the
reported outcome is desirable. In the present experimental con-
text the knew-it-all-along explanation predicts that (also see
Figure 2)
:
Hindsight decision appraisals will differ from foresight
appraisals only when the reported outcome indicates that the
evaluator 1 s advised course of action is the ex post best de-
cision. In such situations, decision appraisals will be:
a. More positive in hindsight than in foresight when the
evaluator agrees with the evaluatee's decision, and
b. More negative in hindsight that in foresight when the
evaluator does not agree with the evaluatee's decision.
An Incentives/Escalation Explanation
Bazerman, Beekun and Schoorman [1982] reported that subse-
quent to negative outcomes, evaluatees in a personnel hiring con-
text were rated more favorably when the evaluator had prior com-
mitment to the evaluatee than when the evaluator had no such
commitment. This result was interpreted as a performance evalua-
tion analogue to the "escalation phenomenon" (see Staw [1976]) in
which the evaluator is motivated to increase his (her) appraisals
to justify his (her) prior commitment (or at least to provide
opportunities to prove such commitment correct) . Schoorman
[1988] extended the escalation effect by suggesting that when an
involved evaluator disagrees with the evaluatee's decision, sub-
seguent performance appraisals would be more negative, presumably
because the evaluator is motivated to justify the initial dis-
agreement. The incentive to escalate commitment, therefore,
would be present only when outcomes are negative with respect to
the target of the evaluator' s commitment (the evaluatee and/or a
course of action) . Otherwise, the evaluator either has no prior
commitment to escalate or no incentive for escalating prior com-
mitment. Thus, in the present experimental context the incen-
tive/escalation explanation predicts that (also see Figure 2)
:
Hindsight decision appraisals will differ from foresight
appraisals only when the reported outcomes indicate that
the course of action to which the evaluator is committed is
not the ex post best decision. In such situations, deci-
sion appraisals will be:
a. More negative in hindsight than in foresight when the
evaluator does not agree with the evaluatee's decision,
b. More positive in hindsight than in foresight when the
evaluator agrees with the evaluatee's decision.
Experiment
Subjects
Ninety-three subjects, predominately senior undergraduates
who were enrolled in a cross-section of the disciplines in the
10
business college of a major state university, served as voluntary
participants in a "capital budgeting appraisal case." To en-
courage participation, subjects were told that experts had solved
the case and that each of the ten participants with advice and
evaluations closest to that of the experts would be awarded $2 5.
The subject had two roles in the experiment. First, the
subject was an advisor to a capital budgeting committee which was
responsible for determining funding priorities for capital expen-
diture proposals made by the various groups within a manufactur-
ing division of a company. Second, the subject was an evaluator
of the division committee's funding priority decisions. Such
evaluations were input to a corporate committee that was respon-
sible for evaluating and monitoring capital expenditure projects
within the company's numerous divisions (as well as determining
the allocation of capital between divisions)
.
Materials
The decision evaluation case, developed by the researchers,
described two capital expenditure projects that were being pro-
posed by different groups with the manufacturing division. One
proposal (project A) involved addition of a new product line and
the other proposal (project B) involved expansion of the group's
production capacity. The case included background information on
the company, the manufacturing division and its various groups,
and additional information on the subject's experimental roles.
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Abstracts for each capital expenditure proposal, prepared by
the respective group managements, also were contained in the
case. Each abstract consisted of information on potential market
growth, competition, and return on investment (described as a
time-adjusted internal rate of return [IRR]). Additionally, a
listing was included of critical factors to achieve success (with
prior probability assessments) and a graphic presentation of
estimated IRRs given alternative market shares as well as the
prior probabilities of achieving those market shares (see Exhibit
1) . Although the two capital expenditure proposals had different
expected returns and estimated risks, the expected return to risk
ratio was the same for each proposal (i.e., 2.0).
INSERT EXHIBIT 1 ABOUT HERE
A series of guestions asked of the subjects was designed to
give them advisory input into the division capital budgeting com-
mittee's funding priority decisions for the two proposals (i.e.,
prior involvement with the evaluatee's decision process). 4 The
subjects were told that the committee would consider the sub-
ject's advice in making its funding priority decisions. This
involvement also was designed to induce subject commitment to the
proposal that he (she) recommended for the highest funding
priority.
Manipulations
Two between-subjects independent variables were employed.
One variable, at two levels, was the relationship between sub-
jects' advice and the division capital budgeting committee's
12
(i.e., the evaluatee's) funding priority decisions. In one level
of this variable the subject and the committee agreed on the ex
ante best proposal (i.e., the subject's advice was adopted by the
committee). In the other level, the subject and the committee
did not agree on the ex ante best proposal (i.e., the subject's
advice was not adopted by the committee). In the former level,
after learning of the committee's agreement, the subject should
be committed to the committee as well as to the advised (and
adopted) proposal. In the latter level, however, after learning
of the committee's disagreement, the subject should not be com-
mitted to the committee nor to the proposal adopted by the com-
mittee, but should remain committed to his (her) advised proposal.
The second variable, at three levels, was the relationship
between the division capital budgeting committee's funding prior-
ity decisions and the outcomes for both projects. The outcomes
either were not reported (i.e., foresight), the committee's deci-
sion was the ex post best decision (i.e., one hindsight version),
or the committee's decision was not the ex post best decision
(i.e., a second hindsight version). 5 In all instances, the capi-
tal allocated by the corporate committee to the division was suf-
ficient to fund only the proposal to which the division capital
budgeting committee assigned the highest funding priority.
Definitions for the levels of the independent variables are
presented in Figure 1. Examining, for example, the "Evaluator
Agree/Committee Decision is Ex Post Best" cell in Figure 1, sub-
jects either could advise that project A or project B be given
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greater funding priority. If the advice were that project A be
given greater funding priority, the subjects in this treatment
were told that the division capital budgeting committee had de-
cided to assign higher funding priority to project A. Addition-
ally, the subjects were told that after five years project A's
IRR was substantially greater than expected, and that project B,
undertaken by a competitor, appeared to have an IRR that was sub-
stantially less than expected (but still positive) . If the
advice, on the other hand, were that project B be given greater
funding priority, subjects in this treatment were told an analo-
gous story to that above except that the division committee
assigned higher funding priority to project B, and that project
B's IRR was substantially greater than expected while project A's
IRR was substantially less than expected (but still positive)
.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Procedure
The subjects were randomly assigned to the experimental con-
ditions with the constraint that cell sizes were approximately
equal. The background information was presented in the form of a
written booklet which the subjects received approximately one-
week prior to the experiment. Additional instructions and exper-
imental stimuli and tasks were presented on video displays con-
nected to personal computers located in a 2 0-machine laboratory.
Following the instructions, subjects first responded to the
series of induced commitment questions. These questions were
asked by the division capital budgeting committee prior to the
14
subjects' either knowing or evaluating that committee's funding
priority decisions. 6 The subjects then were told: 1) which of
the two proposals the division capital budgeting committee had
assigned higher funding priority (together with the committee's
justification), 2) the corporate committee's capital allocation
to the division7 and 3) for hindsight subjects only, the project
outcomes (both for the funded project and for the proposal that
was not funded, but supposedly was undertaken by one of the
company's competitors).
Finally, as part of its capital expenditure evaluating/
monitoring function the corporate committee, at an assumed future
meeting, asked the subjects to evaluate the division capital
budgeting committee's funding priority decision. In particular,
the subjects responded to the following question posed by the
corporate committee:
How strongly do you believe that the division capital bud-
geting committee's decision to recommend funding priority
for [proposal A or B, depending upon treatment assignment]
,
AT THE TIME THEY MADE IT, was the best possible judgment?
The response was elicited on a 20-point scale (-10 to 10) in
which the end points were labeled "worst possible judgment" and
"best possible judgment." For analysis this scale was trans-
formed to an 100-point scale (0 to 100)
.
Results
Planned comparisons were used to analyze hindsight effects
on the capital budgeting decision appraisals. The relevant deci-
sion appraisal contrasts are based on differences in evaluations
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between the two reported outcome (hindsight) levels and the no
reported outcome (foresight) for each level of the evaluator's
agreement with the evaluatee's decision variable. These four
comparisons, presented in Table 1 together with descriptive
statistics and an overall ANOVA, indicate that significant hind-
sight effects occurred when the evaluator did not agree with the
evaluatee's decision, but did not occur when they agreed. When
they did not agree on the ex ante best decision, the evaluators'
appraisals of the evaluatee's decision were significantly: a)
more positive in hindsight than in foresight when the reported
outcome indicated that the evaluatee's decision was ex post best
and b) more negative in hindsight than in foresight when the
reported outcome indicated that the evaluatee's decision was not
the ex post best.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Figure 2 compares these results with the predictions of the
three alternative hindsight-effect explanations. The only treat-
ment which results in unambiguous predictions (i.e., each of the
three explanations make a different prediction) is when the
evaluator does not agree with the evaluatee's decision and the
reported outcomes indicate that the evaluatee's decision was ex
post best. In this treatment, the cognitive schema explanation
predicts positive hindsight effects, the knew-it-all-along ex-
planation predicts no hindsight effects and the incentives/
escalation explanation predicts negative hindsight effects. The
results for this treatment indicate that the hindsight effects
16
are significantly positive (see Table 1) . Further, the predic-
tions based on the cognitive schema explanation are confirmed in
all the other treatments, whereas only some of the predictions
based on the two other explanations (one of four for each) are
confirmed.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Although the hindsight effect evidence generally is not con-
sistent with the knew-it-all-along and the incentives/escalation
explanations, motivational factors consistent with these explana-
tions did appear to have another impact on the subjects' apprai-
sals of the capital budgeting decisions. Independent of the re-
ported outcome, subjects in the agree condition of the ex ante
decision agreement variable (i.e., the decision advised by the
evaluator was made by the evaluatee) made significantly more
favorable decision appraisals than those subjects in the disagree
condition (as reflected on Table 1, F[l,87] = 133.4; p<.01).
Discussion
Generally, the results of the experiment support the cogni-
tive schema explanation for hindsight effects in the present con-
text of capital budgeting decision appraisal. That is, when pre-
viously involved evaluators are committed to the evaluatee'
s
decision, their relatively well-developed cognitive schemata for
the target of commitment appear to prevent hindsight from affect-
ing their appraisals of the evaluatee 's decision. When, however,
previously involved evaluators are not committed to the evalua-
tee ' s decision, their less-developed cognitive schemata for the
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evaluatee's decision allows hindsight to affect their appraisals
of the evaluatee's decision. Extending Brown and Solomon [1987],
the evaluator's committed involvement, rather than involvement
per se, appears to reduce hindsight effects in appraisals of
managerial decisions. Committed evaluators, however, appear to
be motivated to make generally more favorable appraisals than
evaluators who are not committed to the target of evaluation.
Other research has reported stronger support for motivation-
ally-driven explanations, especially the incentive to escalate
commitment. What, then, could account for the difference between
the findings of the present and prior studies? Two factors sug-
gest possible moderating variables: the normativeness of the
evaluatee's decision process and the extremeness of the reported
outcomes. To the extent that the evaluatee's decision process is
considered to be normative (i.e., the process is generally
accepted as the way in which such decisions should be made)
,
there is less need in the face of negative outcomes to justify
the decision and less basis for maintaining that one knew-it-all-
along. In the present study, the normativeness of the evalua-
tee's decision process was relatively high, especially when com-
pared, for example, to a personnel hiring decision. That is, the
justifications given by the division committee for its funding
priority decisions were couched in terms of internal (time
adjusted) rates of return and estimated risks of such returns,
both of which are generally accepted (normative) methods of
evaluating capital expenditures.
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Similarly, when reported outcomes imply a lower degree of
success than expected, rather than failure, there is less need to
justify the decision and less need for maintaining that one knew-
it-all-along. The reported outcomes in the present study implied
degrees of success: the reported outcome that was not the ex
post best outcome was still a successful outcome. Therefore,
motivationally driven hindsight effects in appraisals of capital
budgeting decisions could be diminished relative to the experi-
mental contexts of predecessor studies. Finally, the context of
the present experiment may have been more limited from a social/
organizational perspective than prior studies which, in turn, may
not have presented our subjects with sufficiently strong incen-
tives for escalating prior commitment nor for impression manage-
ment.
In addition to providing a means of distinguishing between
the viability of the various hindsight effect explanations, the
experimental data have implications for the design of systems
used to appraise manager decisions. More specifically, the deci-
sion appraisal process may be designed by management, intention-
ally or unintentionally, such that either decision process gual-
ity or outcome valence is the major basis for appraisal. Within
the context of capital expenditure evaluation, arguments have
been made that in general, evaluation of any single expenditure
(i.e, short-run evaluation) should focus primarily on decision
process quality, whereas evaluation of a series of such decisions
(i.e., long-run evaluation) also must incorporate outcome
19
valences. However, consistent with prior research, our results
suggest that without management attention to design issues, out-
come valence, even in the short-run, can significantly affect
managerial decision appraisals.
"Committed prior involvement," however, may not be the
appropriate design mechanism to induce appraisals based more on
decision process quality than on outcome valences. The costs
associated with the propensity of such evaluators to make gener-
ally more favorable appraisals may outweigh the benefits of
reducing the impact of outcomes on such appraisals. A more
appropriate design mechanism, therefore, may be to directly
modify the content of mangement control and evaluation systems.
For example, major components of most control and evaluation
systems are subsystems of management and accounting information.
Although such information systems are intended to provide
"facts," in reality they provide frames for managerial activities
including performance and decision appraisal. Thus, a different
decision appraisal frame likely would result if, for example,
decision process feedback (such as the validity of decision as-
sumptions and estimates) were reported rather than, or in addi-
tion to, outcome valences (such as favorable versus unfavorable
budget variances) . Consequently, the nature of such "facts" is
of critical design import, and should be congruent with the
objectives of the management control and evaluation systems in
which they are utilized.
20
FOOTNOTES
1. See Feldman [1981] and DeNisi, Cafferty and Meglino [1984] for
reviews of this literature.
2. See Christensen-Szalanski and Fobian [1988] for a meta-
analysis of research on hindsight effects.
3. See Campbell and Tesser [1983]; Ross and Sicoly [1982]; Snyder
[1981]; Ebbesen [1981]; Wong and Weiner [1981].
4. For each proposal, the division capital budgeting committee
asked subjects to: 1) assess the probability that the IRR
would be equal to or greater than X% if the proposal were to
be implemented (where p[IRR > X%] = 0.25); 2) indicate the
extent of their agreement with group management's estimate of
the chance that the IRR would be below the company's desired
minimum if the proposal were to be implemented, 3) indicate
the extent of their agreement with group management's esti-
mate of the most likely IRR if the proposal were to be imple-
mented, 4) indicate the extent of their agreement with group
management's estimate of the most likely incremental market
share if the proposal were to be implemented, 5) assess the
overall reliability that should be placed on the estimates and
assessments contained within the proposal abstract, and indi-
cate estimates or assessments (if any) contained within the
proposal abstract that the subject thought to be unreliable,
and 6) indicate the funding priority that [the subject recom-
mends] the division capital budgeting committee assign to the
proposal.
5. In the ex post best level, the subject was told that the pro-
posal to which the division committee assigned higher funding
priority had an IRR substantially above that expected, and the
other (non-funded) proposal had an IRR substantially below
that expected. In the level that was not ex post best, the
subject was told that the proposal to which the division com-
mittee assigned higher funding priority had an IRR substanti-
ally below that expected, and the other (non-funded) proposal
had an IRR substantially above that expected.
6. The order of presentation for the first five questions (as
presented in Footnote 4) within each proposal were randomized
over subjects; the last question within each proposal remained
the same (also the last question in Footnote 4) . The presen-
tation order of the two capital expenditure proposals was
randomized over subjects.
7. Again, the proposal assigned higher funding priority by the
division committee always was the only project funded.
21
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TABLE 1
Hindsight Effects on Appraisals of Capital Budgeting Decisions
ANOVA:
Source df
Ex ante decision agreement 3
Reported outcome6
Interaction
Error
MS P<
1 42947.97 133.37 .01
2 5835.25 9.06 .01
2 2848.25 4.42 .02
87 322.01
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS:
Ex Ante
Decision
Agreement'
Agree
Agree
Agree
Not Agree
Not Agree
Not Agree
Reported
Outcome6
None
Ex Post Best
Not Ex Post Best
None
Ex Post Best
Not Ex Post Best
Standard
Mean Deviation n
85.16 18.48 16
92.67 7.53 15
86.67 11.75 15
43.44 22.86 16
62.33 21.03 15
26.56 11.79 16
PLANNED COMPARISONS:
Hindsight Treatment Comparison
Ex Ante
Decision
Agreement'
Agree
Agree
Not Agree
Not Agree
Reported
Outcome6
Ex Post Best
Not Ex Post Best
Ex Post Best
Not Ex Post Best
Mean
7.51
1.51
18.89
16.88
Standard
Error
6.45
6.45
6.45
6.34
t(87)
1.165
0.234
2.930
-2.660
P<
.24'
.01'
.01 c
aEx ante agreement is between the decision advised by the evaluator
and the decision made by the evaluatee.
Reported outcomes are with respect to the evaluatee' s decision.
The "None" level is foresight.
cHindsight appraisal - Foresight appraisal.
One-tailed.
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FIGURE 2
Hindsight Effects on Appraisals of Capital Budgeting Decisions:
Alternative Explanation Predictions Compared With Experimental Results
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COGNITIVE SCHEMA
KNEW-IT-ALL-ALONG +
INCENTIVES/ESCAL.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULT
EXPLANATION PREDICTION:
COGNITIVE SCHEMA
KNEW-IT-ALL-ALONG
INCENTIVES/ESCAL.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULT
+
EXPLANATION PREDICTION:
COGNITIVE SCHEMA
KNEW-IT-ALL-ALONG
INCENTIVES/ESCAL. +
EXPERIMENTAL RESULT
EXPLANATION PREDICTION
COGNITIVE SCHEMA
KNEW-IT-ALL-ALONG
INCENTIVES/ESCAL. i
EXPERIMENTAL RESULT
Prediction/Result legend:
= decision appraisals not different in hindsight than in
foresight,
+ = decision appraisals more positive in hindsight than in
foresight, and
= decision appraisals more negative in hindsight than in
foresight.
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